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Read: The Comprehensive and Liability Act After United States v. Fleet

THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
ACT AFTER UNITED STATES v. FLEET
FACTORS: NEW GUIDELINES CONCERNING
LENDER LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

The United States faces a hazardous' waste problem of staggering

proportions. 2 In an attempt to immediately foreclose the spread of the
problem,' and to begin to ameliorate the toxic mess, the 96th Congress
established the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
1. Congress defines "hazardous substance" at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) as follows:
'[H]azardous substance' means (A) any substance designated pursuant to section
1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance
designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921) (but not including any waste the regulation of which
under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended
by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33,
(E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act (42
U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of
Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction
thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
2. Some estimates of the magnitude of the nation's hazardous waste problem run as high as
425,380 potential Superfund sites, with potential cleanup costs for only 2500 of these sites running
$22 billion. Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpretingthe Meaning of Lender Management Participation
Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE LJ. 925 n.6 (1989) [hereinafter YALE Note]. See
also 18 ENvrL. L. REP. (BNA) 2043 (Jan.22, 1988); Note, Superfund: Looking Back, Looking
Ahead, EPA J., Jan.-Feb. 1987, 13, 17 (estimating that the United States had roughly 9000
"problem" waste sites in 1980); Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims
Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 n.5 (1987) [hereinafter
HASTINGS Note] (cost to decontaminate 1800 of the most threatening sites may cost $23 billion).

3. The U.S. produces in excess of 264 million metric tons of hazardous waste annually, enough
to fill the New Orleans Superdome 1,500 times over. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND U.S. POLICY 602 (2d ed. 1990).
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By so doing, Congress brought the problem of

inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites to the forefront of a broad and
comprehensive federal effort to address looming environmental problems such
as air pollution, water pollution, and the general degradation of our nation's

natural resources. 5

CERCLA was designed to respond to and remedy 6 the hazardous waste
problem at inactive and abandoned waste generation or disposal facilities.7 The
passage of CERCLA was the culmination of a twenty year effort to reverse
environmental degradation through legislative directives that included the
passage of the Clean Water Act,9 the Clean Air Act, 0 the Resource

4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) [hereinafter CERCLA] (codified in part as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991)).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1016,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120.
6. The legislative history of CERCLA reveals the two-pronged response mechanism of removal
and remediation. "Removal" focuses on the short term and consists of an immediate cleanup effort.
Removal is properly viewed as a stop gap measure designed to prevent the further spread of
contamination, such as into the soil or groundwater. "Remedial action" consists of more farreaching steps intended as a permanent restoration of the contaminated site. See Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1982).
7. HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1262 n.23 (1987). The Congressional subcommittee
investigating the hazardous waste problem prior to the final passage of CERCLA identified four
characteristics common to dump sites:
(1) The sites contain large quantities of hazardous waste. For example, Hooker
Chemical Company's three disposal sites in Niagara Falls, New York, contained an
estimated 352 million pounds of waste including dioxin tainted TCP. The Valley of the
Drums in Shepardsville, Kentucky contained over 17,000 drums of hazardous wastes.
(2) The widespread use of unsafe design and disposal methods. At the S-Area site at
Niagara Falls, drums of toxic waste were rolled into trenches and tank wagons were
discharged directly into the ground. At Hooker's Montague, Michigan site, workers
hacked open drums with axes and left the wastes to seep into the groundwater.
(3) The sites involve a substantial danger to the environment. Improper disposal
methods rendered the groundwater unusable at Montague, Michigan; Lathrop,
California; and parts of Long Island, as well as at other locations.
(4) Many sites pose major health hazards. The State of New Jersey estimated that a
fire or explosion at the Chemical Control site could release a toxic cloud into the New
York metropolitan area threatening hundreds of thousands of people.
See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 18-19 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6121-22.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120.
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). The Clean Water Act regulates the amount of pollutants
that may be discharged into the nation's surface waters.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). The voluminous Clean Air Act regulates the emissions
of air pollutants.
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Conservation and Recovery Act," and the establishment of the National

Environmental Policy Act." Whereas the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act,
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are primarily regulatory in
nature, CERCLA authorizes broader agency action. 3 CERCLA created a
national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites, 4 and assigned authority
to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to take
emergency assistance and containment actions with respect to those identified
sites.'" Further, CERCLA created a federal cause of action in strict liability 6
to enable the administrator of the EPA to pursue rapid recovery of the costs
incurred from the liable parties 7 and to maintain the viability of the
Superfund." CERCLA names four broad classes of potentially responsible
parties (PRPs),' 9 focusing on the present or past owners or operators of
contaminated sites, and generators or transporters of toxic wastes.'

11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988) [hereinafter RCRAJ.
A companion piece of legislation,
RCRA provides for the "cradle to grave" tracking and regulation of the generation, transportation,
and disposal of toxic wastes throughout the waste cycle. RCRA attempts to prevent hazardous waste
mismanagement at every point in the waste cycle, or from the "cradle to grave." OFFIcE OF SOLID
WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL (Jan. 1986).
By comparison, CERCLA was enacted by Congress to address the growing problem of
improperly disposed of wastes, and to remedy the problem of abandoned waste sites. See H. R.
Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 17-18 (1980), reprinted in (1980) U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6119-20.
12. 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4370 (1988). The National Environmental Policy Act proclaims the
nation's desire to promote a harmonious coexistence between man and his environment.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1016,96thCong.,2dSess. 17-18(1980),reprintedin1980U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120.
14. Id.
15. Id. Superfund mandates the preparation of a National Contingency Plan (NCP). Included
in the NCP is a National Priorities List (NPL) of sites eligible for Superfund-financed cleanups.
Once a site has been placed on the NPL, a remedial investigation and feasibility study is performed.
The proposed actions include an examination of options for treating, controlling or eliminating the
release. The selected remedy is chosen, to the extent practical, within the parameters of the NCP.
H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124,
3125-26.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985) (The
original legislation did not specify exactly what standard of liability should be applied.)
Apparently, Congress intended that the liability standard be resolved by the courts. CERCLA
sponsor Senator Randolph stated that any unresolved liability issues should be "governed by
traditional and evolving principles of common law." See Hastings Note, supra note 2, at 1264 n.18.
When Congress reauthorized CERCLA in 1986, it tacitly approved the strict, joint and several, and
retroactive liability scheme by not changing the liability standards. Id. at 1270 n.5.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120.
18. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
19. CERCLA does not define 'potentially responsible parties."
20. Section 9607(a) of CERCLA defines the four classes of responsible parties as follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
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Recently, at the urging of federal authorities,2 the judiciary has adopted

a more expansive reading of CERCLA liability. 2 For example, in the recent
case of United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. ,3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that despite the statutory exemption for secured creditors a

lender may be liable for merely having the potential to influence a debtor's
operations.2 However, such an expansive reading of CERCLA liability means
that parties such as financial institutionss or subsequent landowners 26 who
have only a tenuous connection to the generation, transportation, and disposal

of toxic wastes may be liable for the entire cost of cleanup operations." This
broadening standard of CERCLA liability undermines the express provision in
the original legislation and subsequent amendments'

exempting secured

operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) Any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or site selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1991).
Although the "owner and operator" language of CERCLA § 9607(a)(1) reads in the
conjunctive, the legislative history of CERCLA reveals an intent for the statute to be read in the
disjunctive. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. Section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA further
defines the terms "owners" and "operators." See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
21. See Phillip D. Reed, Comment, CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, 15 ENVrL. L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10395 (1985).
22. Courts have held that current owners of sites, as well as those that owned such sites at the
time of disposal are liable under § 9607(a) of CERCLA. See HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at
1266.
23. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
24. 901 F.2d at 1557.
25. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (Financial
institution held liable after the institution foreclosed and took tide to debtor's facility). See infra
notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
26. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (subsequent landowner
held liable for costs to cleanup contamination caused by previous owner).
27. See id. at 1037 (present owner not involved with the prior owner's improper disposal
practices was held liable for cleanup costs); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Corp., 632
F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986) (bank holding a lien on the property found liable for the entire
response costs after it foreclosed); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (1 th
Cir. 1990) (lender liable for cleanup costs because it could have exercised financial control).
28. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(West Supp. 1990)).
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Because the

courts have failed to articulate guidelines, lenders are unsure what level of
involvement in a debtor's operations will trigger CERCLA liability.
Consequently, small businesses and other potential borrowers will have more
difficulty obtaining and affording credit. 3
Section I of this Note outlines the basic theories of CERCLA liability and
the development of the secured creditor exemption. 2 Section II tracks the
broadening theories of liability concerning secured creditors and the decreasing
availability of the statutory exemption for secured creditors as reflected in two
recent cases that extended liability to creditors based on slightly different
principles." Section III examines the further narrowing of the CERCLA
secured creditor exemption in United States v. Fleet Factors.' Section IV
examines the effect of the expanding CERCLA secured creditor liability on the

29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983). See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
30. Section 9607(b)(3) provides for an exclusion from liability when the damages were caused

by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or
than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substances, in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foresceably result
from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (West 1983).
Section 9601(35)(A) of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
expanded on the liability exclusion and provided what is known as the "innocent landowner"
defense, which basically exempted from liability any party that acquired title to a site or facility but
did not know or have reason to know at the time of acquisition that there was a release or threatened
release of hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
The innocent purchaser defense was created as a response to the seemingly unjust results
reached in some of the pre-SARA cases. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986). See Infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
31. 5 TOXics L. RE. (BNA) 1, 25 (June 6, 1990) (the increased transaction costs due to more
detailed investigations by lenders concerning the nature of the borrower's activities and the present
condition of the site will be passed along to the borrower)
32. See infra notes 35-67 and accompanying text. Some courts have characterized CERCLA
as "poorly drafted, hastily considered, and bereft of useful legislative history." See Lewis M. Barr,
CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Underthe ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,

Compensationand Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUs. LAW. 923 (1990).
33. See Infra notes 68-96 and accompanyingtext. Maryland Bank &Trust Corp., 632 F. Supp.
573 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D.
Pa. 1985). See infra notes 80, 97, 113 and accompanying text.
34. 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
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financial community. Finally, section V proposes a statutory modification to

establish predictable guidelines for commercial lenders seeking to avoid
CERCLA liability.
I. CERCLA LLBILITY, DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS

A. CERCLA Financing
Because CERCLA's goal is to spread the cost of environmental cleanup
among those who profit from the generation of hazardous waste,3' the financing

scheme is inextricably related to the liability, defenses, and exemptions of
CERCLA.' To finance the response and remediation actions taken pursuant
to CERCLA, Congress set aside a $1.6 billion fund, commonly known as the
"Superfund." 37 In 1986, to confront the growing number of Superfund
sites,' Congress provided an additional $8.5 billion as part of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).3 The initial revenues for the
Superfund were provided through a special tax on chemical and petroleum
producers, and through general tax revenues.'
Furthermore, Congress
envisioned a self-perpetuating or "revolving fund" financed primarily by those
35. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-64 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6155.
36. See id.
37. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507(a) (West Supp. 1990). The Superfund was to be financed by fees or
excise taxes from the petrochemical, inorganic chemical and oil industries in proportion to their
contribution to the annual hazardous waste stream. Grad, supra note 6, at 5-6.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3125.
The Committee on Public Works and Transportation, in its report on H.R. 2817 prior to
passage of the 1986 SARA revisions issued a scathing condemnation of the EPA's mismanagement
of Superfund in the early 1980s. An Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee examination of the
EPA's efforts led to the conclusion that the administrators were more concerned with conserving
monies in the fund than they were with spending funds to clean up hazardous waste sites. The EPA
administrator, Anne Gorsuch, was cited by Congress for contempt and eventually left the EPA in
March of 1983, followed shortly thereafter by approximately twenty other senior agency officials.
See Id. at 3126.
39. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (West
Supp. 1990)).
40. The Superfund is financed from three sources. Eleven percent of the fund comes from the
general fund of the United States Treasury, 73% is from taxes levied on petroleum and chemical
related businesses, and about 16% of the fund comes from penalties, recoveries, and interest earned
on the balance of the Superfund. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-85-2) ILLEGAL
DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFICULT TO DETECT OR DETER 12 (Feb. 1985). See also
HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1264 n.23 (Of the initial Superfund monies approved in 1980,
87.5% came from special taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals, and 12.5% came from general
revenue appropriations).
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industries that profited from the generation of hazardous wastes."
In addition to the funds raised by special taxes on waste generating

products, CERCLA provided a cause of action to recover response costs from
PRPs, with those recovered funds going back into the Superfund for future
use.42 This cost recovery scheme was intended to prevent premature depletion
of the Superfund and to foster the private allocation of responsibility for the
enormous cleanup costs required.' 3 CERCLA empowered the government to
recover response costs by giving the EPA the authority to file suit against a

PRP."
B. CERCLA Liability, Defenses, and Exemptions
To supplement and refurbish the Superfund, CERCLA names four broad
classes of responsible parties including owners or operators of contaminated
sites, as well as generators and transporters 5 of toxic wastes.' The class of

41. The "revolving fund" could be replenished as damages were recovered in cases where some
of the "culprits" could be identified. Furthermore, a revolving fund financed primarily by the
industries that profit from the generation of hazardous wastes would more equitably reflect the
responsibility for the problem, and would tend to minimize contributions required by federal
taxpayers.
H.R. REt. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 63-64 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6140 (remarks of Senator Gore).
42. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a), in order to recover its response costs, the government must

prove that:
(1) the site is a "facility";
(2) a "release" or "threatened release" of any "hazardous substance" from the site has
occurred;

(3) the release or threatened release has caused the federal government to incur
"response costs"; and

(4) the defendant is one of the persons designated as a party liable for costs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1990).
Response costs generally include costs of investigation and cleanup. However, the EPA is also
empowered under § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) to recover for damage to natural resources and for the costs
of health assessments. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (West 1983). See also Edmund B.
Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive For Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 HoUs. L. REv.
951, 952 (1988).
43. Barr, supra note 32, at 1001.
44. The provisions allocating administration and enforcement powers to the EPA were not
uniformly favored. Congressman Stockman (R-Michigan) proposed a system of federal formula
grants to fund state cleanup and remediation efforts. Stockman claimed the adopted provisions gave
the EPA excessive discretion and feared the EPA would become the "czar over every hazardous
waste site in the entire country." Stockman further asserted that the bill would turn "EPA people
loose to go dig up everything in the country." See Grad, supra note 6, at 15-16.

45. The problems created by generators andlor transporters of hazardous wastes is now more
appropriately addressed by RCRA and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note
11 and accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1990). See supra notes 19-20 and accompanyingtext.
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PRPs is subject to strict,47 joint and several,' and retroactive liability.' In
5°
other words, causation is not a required element of the government's case.
Therefore PRPs may be found liable regardless of their lack of fault or
negligence. 5'
Under the CERCLA strict liability scheme,52 defendants such as
commercial lenders are liable unless they can invoke one of CERCLA's
affirmative defenses.53 The statutory defenses exclude potential defendants
from liability if a release or threatened release is caused by an act of God, an
act of war, or an act or omission of a third party who has no contractual
relationship with the defendant.' Although the affirmative defenses are rarely
47. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
that CERCLA imposes strict liability on the property owner regardless of the present owner's lack
of responsibility for the site contamination).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(when two or more persons acting independently caused a single and indivisible harm each is liable
for the entire harm).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985). When
Congress reauthorized CERCLA in 1986, it tacitly approved the strict, joint and several, and
retroactive liability schemes by not changing the liability standards. See also HASTINGS Note, supra
note 2, at 1267.
50. The imposition of strict liability has a strong history of being used to implement long-term
public policy goals by creating an incentive to affect private conduct. See generally Frost, supra
note 32.
51. Under RCRA, an environmental statute analogous to CERCLA, the legislative history states
that any party who has contributed or is contributing to the creation, existence, or maintenance of
an environmental hazard is subject to liability without regard to fault or causation. See Cynthia
Anne Oppliger, Note, PurringRecovery Back Into RCRA: An Effective Addition to the Resource
Conservationand Recovery Act, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 59, 71 n.59 (1990). Furthermore, the liability
provisions of CERCLA and RCRA are to be interpreted in a similar manner. See Grad, supra note
6, at 9.
52. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). The Shore Realty
court concluded that proof of causation as a component of landowner liability would render
"superfluous" one of CERCLA's affirmative defenses, and would open a huge loophole in
CERCLA's liability scheme. Id. at 1044-45. The court explained as follows:
[I] the current owner of a site could avoid liability merely by having purchased the site
after chemical dumping had ceased, waste sites certainly would be sold, following the
cessation of dumping, to new owners who could avoid the liability otherwise required
by CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that persons who dump or store hazardous
waste sometimes cannot be located or may be deceased orjudgment-proof. We will not
interpret Section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the
absence of a specific congressional intent otherwise.
Id. at 1045.
53. See generally HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1267-75.
54. The affirmative defenses provided in § 9607(b) of CERCLA are defined as:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant,
or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
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presented to the courts,55 the courts have construed the section 9607(b) defenses
narrowly.m
Potential CERCLA defendants such as lenders 7 may also attempt to show
that they fall outside of the class of identified PRPs. When Congress passed the
Superfund legislation in 1980, it created a secured creditor exemption by
expressly excluding from liability any parties who hold "indicia of ownership"
primarily to protect a security interest and who do not "participate in the
management" of the facility.s Under section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA, these
parties were expressly excluded from the definition of "owners or operators."
The courts have eroded the secured creditor exemption by holding lenders
liable for cleanup costs under two theories. First, when a financial institution

existing directly or indirectly with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omiuions of any such third party and the consequences that could reasonably result
from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983).
55. See HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1268.
56. See id. The narrow interpretation of the affirmative defenses is compelled by CERCLA's
stringent conditions which require the defendant to show by a preponderance that the release or
threatened release was caused solely by one or more of the enumerated forces. Id. (emphasis
added).
57. Cases involving lender liability are not as common as those involving landowners, because
the government has not pursued lenders as a class the way it has pursued other classes of parties
named under CERCLA's liability provisions. See YALE Note, supra note 2, at 929 n.27. The
government will bring an action against a bank when it finds that the owner or operator is insolvent
and the defense and exemptions are unavailable. Id.
58. See Id. at 926.
59. 42 U.S.C.A § 9601(20)(A) excludes secured creditors from liability as follows:
[Such term ("owners or operators") does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
42 U.S.C.A § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
The legislative history describes the secured creditor exemption as follows:
(The term "owner"] does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership
(such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or
operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in
connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws,
rules, or regulations. [A] . . . financial institution which held title primarily to secure
a loan but also received tax benefits as the result of holding title would not be an
"owner" as long as it did not participate in the management or operation of the vessel
or facility.
H.R. REP No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160,6181.
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forecloses on a parcel of land, it may then be found liable as an owner. 6

Second, when a lender attempts to exert financial control over a debtor's
business operations in an attempt to prevent failure, that lender has effectively
"participated in the management" of the debtor's business and therefore loses
the secured creditor exemption provided by section 9601(20)(A)." '

Lenders who face liability after foreclosing on their security interest, may
attempt to invoke the "innocent purchaser" defense.' Although not included
in the original legislation, Congress in the 1986 SARA amendments acted to
create this defense to protect subsequent purchasers of contaminated property,
who did not contribute to the contamination of the parcel in question.A As

with the other types of defenses and exclusions under CERCLA, the innocent
purchaser defense is difficult to establish and extremely limited in scope.' To
qualify for the innocent purchaser defense, potential purchasers have an
affirmative duty to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" using "due diligence" into

the nature of the prior owner's activities.' The courts have found that if a
party has failed to discover subsequently revealed contamination, that party
simply did not use due diligence.' As construed by the courts, this defense
is largely beyond the reach of subsequent landowners.'
The courts have applied varying interpretations in defining the scope and
extent of the defenses and exemptions contained in CERCLA. This has left
lenders unsure as to what constitutes an "indicia of ownership," and what
constitutes "participation in the management" sufficient to void the secured
creditor exemption. To illustrate this point, it is necessary to examine the

60. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
62. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (a lender
may be liable for the full amount of the hazardous waste cleanup operation if it forecloses on
property that turns out to be contaminated, regardless of the lender's lack of contribution to the
contamination).
Although the exclusion for innocent landowners is often characterized as an affirmative
defense, it is more properly characterized as an exemption from the class of liable parties. Hence
its inclusion in the § 9601 list of definitions.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1990). The "innocent landowner defense" was
created to eliminate the 'onerous" liability concerning subsequent purchasers. See H.R. REP. No.
253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124,3125. See, e.g., New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Serafini, 711 F. Supp.
197 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
64. See HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1267.
65. See generally JAMES P. O'BRIEN, ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENcE: THE COMPLETE
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE LENDERS, BUYERS, SELLERS, AND ATTORNEYS (BNA 1989).
66. BCW Assoc. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 3 ToXacs L. REP. (BNA) 943 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(Parties who perform an environmental assessment of the site are still liable if that assessment is later
shown to have been inaccurate.)
67. See HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1268 n.44.
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varying results in several cases involving the question of secured creditor

liability.
H. EXPANDING LENDER LlAmLrrY UNDER CERCLA
A. Lenders as Landowners
CERCLA exempts lenders "who, without participating in the management"
of a facility hold an "indicia of ownership primarily to protect [a] security
interest in the. . . facility."
Such lenders are exempt from liability because

they are excluded from CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator."'
Section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA quite clearly defines an "owner or operator"

of a facility as anyone who formerly or presently owns, operates, or charters a
vessel or facility.'
However, the precise meaning of the exemption for
secured creditors who hold an "indicia of ownership" is unclear because
Congress simply did not provide much guidance to assist with interpretation.7 t
CERCLA was hastily drafted and adopted and has only a sparse legislative

history.'
Therefore, it is difficult to determine precisely what Congress
intended to qualify as an "indicia of ownership" or "participat[ion] in the
management" of a facility.' In the past several years CERCLA litigation has
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983).
69. Id.
70. Section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA defines "owner or operator" as follows:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such
Vessel,
(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility, and
(iii) in the case of an abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment. Such term
does not include a person who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or facility.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983).
71. See Grad, supra note 6, at 1. CERCLA's sparse legislative history is due to the fact that
CERCLA was passed in the closing days of a lame duck Congress, as a substitute for all pending
bills, and under a suspension of the rules with virtually no room for amendments. Id. at 1-2.
72. See YALE Note, supra note 2, at 925.
73. The legislative history describes the secured creditor exemption as follows:
[the term ("owners or operators")] does not include certain persons possessing indicia
of ownership (such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in
connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws,
rules, or regulations. [A) . . . financial institution which held title primarily to secure
a loan but also received tax benefits as the result of holding title would not be an
.owner" as long as it did not participate in the management or operation of the vessel
or facility.
H.R. REP. No. 172, Part 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6160,
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centered on landowners.74 Four categories of landowners may be liable."
Section 9607(a) of CERCLA names two groups, including current owners of a
contaminated site and those that owned the site at the time of the waste
disposal.76 Section 9601(20)(A) defines the third category of landowner as any
former owner whose interest in the property was conveyed to the government
as a result of bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment or similar
means.'
Finally, section 9601(35)(C) defines the fourth category as any
landowner who transfers ownership of property without disclosing the existence
of a hazardous waste problem.' Again, each of the four classes of landowners
is subject to strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability, without regard to

causation."
Reflecting the trend towards a more expansive theory of liability.' the
court in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Corp."' held that a lender
who forecloses and takes title to a piece of property containing hazardous waste
is not protected by the secured creditor exemption.' In Maryland Bank, the

6181.
74. In the early stages of CERCLA the thrust of the litigation focused on generators. See
generally Reed, supra note 21. However, the present focus of CERCLA litigation has shifted to
landowners; Phillip D. Reed, Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of
GeneratorLiability, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10,224 (1984).
75. See HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1265-66.
76. The portions of § 9607(a) of CERCLA pertaining to landowners reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) The owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States) or a facility,
(2) Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1990).
77. The section 9601(20)(A)(iii) definition of a CERCLA "owner or operator- consists of the
following:
(iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983).
78. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1990).
79. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
81. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
82. In the 1970s Maryland Bank & Trust Co. (Maryland Bank) loaned money for business
operations to Herschel McLeod, who ran a trash and garbage business on his family farm. Id. at
575-76. In 1980 Maryland Bank loaned $335,000 to McLeod's son to purchase the farm. Id.
Approximately a year later, the junior MeLeod stopped making payments and the bank began
foreclosure actions. In 1982, Maryland Bank purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for
$381,500. Id. The record does not disclose why the bank bid in excess of the outstanding debt.
The EPA inspected the site in 1983 and discovered 237 drums of chemicals and 1180 tons of
contaminated soil. The EPA investigation also disclosed that the two disposal areas contained buried
drums, some of which were leaking. Tests identified the presence of chromium, cadmium, lead,
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Maryland Bank & Trust Corporation foreclosed on property used to secure a
loan, and subsequently purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.' s4
Maryland Bank then claimed protection under the secured creditor exemption.
The central issue in Maryland Bank was the scope and extent of the secured
creditor exemption provided by section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA. Maryland
Bank's primary assertion was that it qualified for the secured creditor exemption
because its ownership came about pursuant to actions taken to protect the bank's
security interest.' However, the court declined to adopt the bank's liberal
interpretation of the exemption and opted for a more narrow construction of the
secured creditor exemption.6
In adopting a narrow interpretation of CERCLA's secured creditor
exemption, the court reasoned that the exemption only applies if at the time of
the cleanup, the lender's interest in the subject property is limited to an "indicia
of ownership."' Maryland Bank's previously held security interest had been
converted from an "indicia of ownership" to full ownership by virtue of the
bank's purchase at the foreclosure sale.' Therefore, under CERCLA's strict
liability provisions the bank was liable as a current "owner or operator" under
section 9601(20)(A) even though it did not own the site at the time of disposal
or contribute to the contamination in any way."
mercury, toluene, cyanide compounds, ethylbenzene, and xylenes. [Pending Litigation 1971-1990]
ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65,847 (1985).
The EPA subsequentlyinstituted a cleanup operation at the cost of $551,713.50after Maryland
Bank refused to initiate corrective action on its own. The EPA then sued Maryland Bank after the
bank refused to reimburse the EPA, and both sides moved for summary judgment. Maryland Bank,
632 F. Supp. at 575-76.
83. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 575-76.
84. Id. at 577.
85. The bank raised two other arguments in support of its motion. First, that current owners
of hazardouswaste sites could only be held liable under § 9607(a)(1) if they also operated such sites.
Second, the bank raised a third party defense under § 9607(b)3). Id. at 576.
The court dismissed the first argument and reasoned that to adopt the bank's interpretation of
CERCLA's liability provisions would render § 9607(a)(1) useless because the class of "owners and
operators" would contain no members. By definition, an owner simply cannot be the person as an
operator. Id. at 578.
The court dismissed the bank's second argument on the grounds that genuine issues of fact
exist concerning the reasonableness of the bank's conduct in light of bank's knowledge of the prior
owner's uses of the land. Further, the full nature of the contractual arrangements between the
parties was not clear, thus precluding the assertion of a third party defense under § 9607(b)(3). Id.
at 581.
86. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986).
87. The court reasoned that the verb tense used in the exemption was critical. Section
9601(20)(A) states that the exemption applies when a creditor "holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect a security interest ... [emphasis added].' Id. at 578-79.
88. The court also pointed out that the bank had been full owner for an "extended period of
time." Id. at 579 n.5.
89. See United States v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Even though the Maryland Bank result fits snugly within the parameters of
CERCLA's long term goals of fostering diligence within the private sector, a
more liberal interpretation of the secured creditor exemption would essentially
convert CERCLA into an insurance policy for lenders9' by protecting them
against possible losses due to loans secured with polluted properties.'
However, because foreclosure may turn a lien into full ownership, lenders are
faced with the alternative of avoiding CERCLA liability or foregoing foreclosure
and facing the prospect of losing the value of their collateral." Such a
dilemma creates a disincentive for banks to extend credit because they are
unsure if their investment is fully secured.'
Under Maryland Bank, the protection offered by the secured creditor
exemption evaporates once a lender's security interest ripens into full
ownership.95 Therefore, if a lender does not foreclose on a parcel, the
protection offered by the secured creditor exemption theoretically remains in
force.'
This assumes, however, that the lender does not "participate in the
management of a . . . facility," the precise meaning of which had yet to be
clarified by the courts.
B. Lenders Participatingin Management
The second way the courts have eroded the secured creditor exemption is
by the courts' adoption of an expansive interpretation of lender management
participation.' In theory, a secured creditor who does not "participate in the

90. The court expanded by pointing out that financial institutions are in a position to investigate
and discover potential problems with secured properties. Under the long term goals of CERCLA,
such investigations should be routine. Therefore, CERCLA should not absolve financial institutions
from mistakes in judgment when they have the ability to protect themselves by making prudent
loans. MarylandBank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
See also YALE Note, supra note 2, at 935 n.58 (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("we must

provide incentives for the government and private parties to join together rather than litigate"); id.
at 926 n.15 (CERCLA provisions are meant to foster increased diligence in the financial
community).
But compare id. at 937 n.62 (A low threshold of liability decreases a bank's incentive to
monitor a borrower's practices).
91.

See YALE Note, supra note 2, at 936.

92. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986).
93. See YALE Note, supra note 2, at 926 n.16 (A bank may avoid liability by deciding not to
foreclose, but in so doing faces the prospect of losing it's collateral).

94.
95.
96.
1985).
97.

See 5 TOxics L. REP. (BNA) at 75. See also infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
But see United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa.
See generally YALE Note, supra note 2, at 929.
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management of a .
facility" is entitled to the secured creditor exemption."
However, lenders are unsure what level of involvement is sufficient to remove
them from the protection of the secured creditor exemption, thus triggering
CERCLA liability.i

The recent case of United States v. Mirabile reflects the difficulty lenders
face interpreting the meaning of management participation."m In Mirabile, the
EPA brought an action to recover response costs incurred by the removal of
hazardous waste from property owned by defendants Anna and Thomas
Mirabile.' 01
The Mirabiles joined American Bank and Trust Company
("American Bank") and Mellon Bank (East) National Association ("Mellon") as
third party defendants.I"e The government, the Mirabiles, and both banks
moved for summary judgment. 3
Both banks asserted the CERCLA secured creditor exemption as a
defense.' 0" The court recognized that individuals or corporations not involved
in the management of a facility are exempted from CERCLA liability,0" and
acknowledged that the difficulty arises in determining how far a creditor may go
to protect its financial interests.106
The banks argued "that a secured creditor's exercise of financial control
over a debtor should not bring the creditor within the scope of CERCLA
liability. " "' But the court declined to adopt American Bank's and Mellon's

98. This is the argument raised by the defendant in United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVrL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994.
99. See generally HASTINGS Note, supra note 2, at 1267.
100. 15 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
101. The Mirabiles' took title to a former paint manufacturing facility at a sheriff's sale after
American Bank and Trust foreclosed on the property. Id. at 20,995.
102. The Mirabiles asserted as a defense that the Small Business Administration (SBA) was an
indispensable party under F.R.C.P. 19. See 15 ENVrL. L. REP. at 20,995. American Bank and
Mellon also counterclaimed against the SBA alleging the SBA was involved in creating the
conditions at the site. Id. The claims involving the SBA do not affect the court's interpretation of
the secured creditor exemption. Id.
103. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20,995.
104. Id.
105. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F.
Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Md. 1984) (the exemption from liability for lenders who are not involved
in management activities gives rise to the inference that lenders who are actively involved in
management should lose the protection of the secured creditor exemption).
106. The court further explained the problem as "defining the point at which participation is
too attenuated to permit the imposition of liability." Id.
107. American Bank foreclosed after the previous owner defaulted, prior to the Mirabiles'
purchase. After foreclosure, American Bank merely took actions to secure the property. It boarded
up windows and locked the buildings to prevent vandalism, and made inquiries into the cost of
disposing of drums found on the site. United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
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interpretation of management participation."08 Instead the court reasoned that
the exemption suggested that secured creditors may avoid liability if they are not
"excessively entangled" in the financial affairs of the actual owners.'09
The Mirabilecourt's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption is not
conducive to ready interpretation, nor does it provide workable guidelines for
lenders seeking to avoid CERCLA liability.' 0 Although the facts of the case
seem to justify the court's conclusion,"' lenders cannot rely on the Mirabile
standard as a guide." 2 Clearly, lenders who participate in the "day-to-day"
operational management of a facility lose the protection of the secured creditor
exemption, because such actions qualify lenders as operators. However, based
on the Mirabile interpretation, a lender must toe the line between permissible
and impermissible management participation with only the "excessive
entanglement" standard to guide its actions. Such a standard is vague and
ambiguous at best, and easily subject to a myriad of judicial interpretations. As
a result, banks are discouraged from monitoring their debtor's disposal practices
and are effectively precluded from encouraging the exercise of safe disposal
practices out of the fear of incurring liability."'
III.

LENDER LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES V. FLEET FACTORS

The issue of lender liability was most recently addressed in United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp."4 In Fleet Factors, the court extended the principle
enunciated in the Mirabile case."' In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet)
entered into an agreement with the Swainsboro Print Works (SPW) in which
Fleet agreed to advance funds against the assignment of SPW's accounts
receivable." 6 In 1979, SPW filed for bankruptcy, but the agreement between

at 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (emphasis added). The court eventually dismissed liability as
to American Bank under § 9601(20)(A) because its actions were "plainly" taken to protect the bank's
security interest in the property. Id.
108. Id. at 20,995-96.
109. Id. The court explained "were it not for the [Section 9601(20)(A) security exemptionl,
the definition (of owner] would be a hopeless tautology." Id.
110. See United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F. 2d 1550 (1 lth Cir. 1990); see infra notes 11429 and accompanying text.
111. One of Mellon's officers was always present at the site. The officer determined the order
in which orders were filled, he monitored the cash accounts and established a reporting system
between the company and the bank.
112. See Barr, supra note 32, at 979.
113. See YALE Note, supra note 2, at 929 n.27
114. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
115. United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994. See supra notes
100-13 and accompanying text.
116. As collateral for the cash advances, Fleet obtained a lien on SPW's textile facility and all
of its equipment, fixtures, and inventory. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1552.
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Shortly

thereafter, SPW ceased operations and began to liquidate its inventory, while
Fleet continued to collect on the value of the outstanding accounts." s In May
of 1982, Fleet foreclosed on the remainder of SPW's inventory and
equipment." 9 In 1984, the EPA surveyed the site, found contamination, and
subsequently instituted an action against Fleet for the recovery of response costs
°
after the site was decontaminated.'
Fleet claimed protection under the
2
'
secured creditor exemption.'
In Fleet Factors, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the

critical issue was whether the lender (Fleet) participated in the management of
the facility to such an extent as to trigger CERCLA liability." Fleet asked
the court to delineate the distinction between permissible and impermissible

management participation as the court in Mirabile attempted to do."2

The court stated that the Mirabile construction of the secured creditor
exemption was too permissive toward lenders."
The court reasoned that in
order to achieve the "overwhelmingly remedial" goals of CERCLA, ambiguous
statutory terms should be construed to favor liability." z Therefore, the court
determined that a lender needs only to be "affiliated" with the debtor's

117. In 1981, Fleet ceased advancing funds to SPW when the amount of SPW's debts exceeded
the value of their accounts receivable. Id.
118. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1552.
119. In December of 1981, a court adjudicated SPW a bankrupt, and a trustee assumed title to
the facility. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1 lth Cir. 1990). Fleet
subsequently foreclosed and contracted with Baldwin Industrial Liquidators to auction off the
remaining inventory and equipment. Id. In August of 1982 Fleet contracted with Nix Riggers, who
apparently had a free hand and were to remove the unsold equipment and material and leave the
premises "broom clean." Id.
120. On January 20, 1984, the "EPA" surveyed the site and found 700 fifty-five gallon drums
containing toxic chemicals and forty-four truckloads of asbestos containing material. 901 F.2d at
1552. The EPA incurred roughly S400,000 in response costs to remediate the SPW facility. Id.
In 1987, the title to the facility was conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia, due to SPW's failure
to pay state and county taxes. Id.
121. The district court refused to dismiss the case on Fleet's motion for summary judgment.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D. Ga. 1988). The lower court
found that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether Fleet could be found liable as a third party
because Fleet's agents may have been responsible for releasing asbestos during the liquidation and
removal of SPW's assets. Id.
122. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (1 th Cir. 1990). The secured
creditor exemption is contained in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983).
123. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1556.
124. Id. at 1557.
125. Id. See Maryland Bank & Trust Corp., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986). See also
HASTINOS Note, supra note 2, at 1285-86.
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management."' The court then declared that "a secured creditor will be liable
if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to
support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if
it so chose."12 7 The Fleet Factors holding has established a lower threshold
of lender liability because virtually all lenders "could" affect hazardous waste
disposal practices if they so chose.'s Consequently, lenders find it virtually
impossible to claim protection under CERCLA's secured creditor
exemption. 29
IV. CURRENT LENDER LABiLrry UNDER CERCLA
A. The Chilling Effect on Lenders
The expanding theories of lender liability which began with MarylandBank,
continued in Mirabile, and culminated in Fleet Factors, has lead to the
establishment of three categories of lenders subject to liability despite the
statutory exemption for secured creditors."' First, under Maryland Bank, a
3
lender that forecloses on contaminated property is liable as an owner.' '
Second, under Mirabile, a lender "affiliated" with a debtor's management is
liable as an operator.3 2 Finally, under Fleet Factors a lender loses the
protection of the secured creditor exemption if that lender "could have exercised
control" over a facility if it so chose. 3
The expansion of lender liability in the wake of Fleet Factors has "sent

126. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.ll. The court justified its "affiliation" approach to
lender management participation by citing a passage from CERCLA's legislative history. Id.
Referring to the addition of the secured creditor exemption to the bill that was finally passed, one
sponsor stated the following:
mhis change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently subjected those
who hold title to a ... facility, but do not participate in the management or operation
and are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the... facility, to
the liability provisions of the bill.
Id. (remarks of Rep. Harsha).
127. Id. at 1557 (emphasis added).
128. See 5 TOXIcs L. REP. (BNA) 1, 23-24 (1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25.
131. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Corp., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). See
supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
132. United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
133. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). See supra notes
114-29 and accompanyingtext. See also 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 305, 308 (June 8, 1990) (The Fleet
Factorsdecision effectively creates a new category of responsible parties.)
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tremors through the financial community."11 Many lenders feel that the Fleet
Factors decision has eroded the secured creditor exemption to the point of
creating a chilling effect on commercial lending transactions.3S As a result,
lenders will simply avoid extending credit to businesses that use hazardous
materials or that are located in areas of possible contamination."
This
chilling effect makes it more difficult for small businesses to obtain and afford
credit, and has spurred a drive in Congress to expand the availability of the
secured creditor exemption.237
B. The Need for Workable Guidelines
The low threshold of lender liability forces lenders into an impossible
situation. On one band, lenders may be liable for the cost of cleanup operations
if they foreclose on a borrower's contaminated property," or lenders may be
liable for cleanup costs if they actually influence or merely have the potential to
influence a debtor's day-to-day activities. 39 On the other hand, in an attempt
to avoid CERCLA liability, lenders must refrain from protecting their
investment through foreclosure or must abstain from giving financial or
operational advice while they watch their investment disappear in the face of a

134. 5 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1, 75 (1990). The mere threat of litigation, regardless of the
actual outcome, deters lenders from entering loan agreements. Id. The threat of litigation also
deters creditors from taking normal actions to protect their investment, such as instituting foreclosure
or providing financial advice. Id. However, the EPA has proposed new regulations ostensibly to
limit the effect of Fleet Factors. See Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28798 (1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24, 1991).
But see Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Dealfor Lenders?, 22
ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1158 (1991)(One category of special interest after another has sought to justify
its special need to escape Superfund liability).
135. 5 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) at 74.
136. Id. The types of small businesses potentially affected by CERCLA liability, and thus
potentially affected by tightened credit, include auto paint or repair shops, dry cleaners, farms, or
"any business that has some sort of tank in the ground." Id.
137. "The Fleet Factorsdecision is a troublesome indicator of why there has to be a legislative
solution." 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 308 (1990) (Statement of Thomas .. Greco, Associate General
Counsel of the American Banking Association). The drive towards reform seems to be gaining
momentum in Congress. As of June of 1990, one proposed reform bill already had 118 co-sponsors
in the House of Representatives. See 5 TOXwcs L. REI'. at 75. Furthermore, sponsors anticipate
the support of at least 100 more co-sponsors in the near future. Id. However, the pending
CERCLA revisions merely expand the category of parties eligible for the secured creditor exemption
without clarifying the allowable level of participation. See id.
138. "In other words, a simple $50,000 loan may saddle a lender with S5,000,000 in cleanup
costs for a problem that it did nothing to create". 5 TOxics L. REP. (BNA) 1, 75 (1990) (Remarks
of Rep. LaFalce).
139. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990).
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debtor's looming bankruptcy."
However, any solution designed to safeguard lenders must be fashioned so
as not to undercut the long term goals of CERCLA. In other words, any
revisions to the secured creditor exemption should not simply create an
"insurance policy" for lenders. 4 ' If the availability of the secured creditor
exemption is overly liberalized, creditors will lose any incentive to be part of the
solution and instead will aggravate the problem by choosing the safe haven of
ignorance. Lenders should not be allowed to manage a debtor's activities, and
profit therefrom, under the protection of an overly broad exemption.
The long term goals of CERCLA are best achieved when prudent lenders
independently act to identify problems at an early stage.142 By being involved
with their creditors, lenders can encourage environmental diligence within the
private sector. For example, lenders could write environmental compliance and
143
remediation clauses into commercial loan agreements prior to closing.
Further, lenders can exercise greater scrutiny concerning the nature of the
borrower's business operations.' " Finally, lenders can and should require
environmental audits of both the nature of a prospective borrower's business
activities and the past and present operations carried out on the property used
as security for the loan.'45 However, under the current interpretation of the
second creditor exemption, the threat of litigation and the fear of lender liability
deters lenders from freely engaging in such environmentally conscious business
activities. "
Lenders must be allowed to exercise financial prudence to protect the
quality of their investments without the threat of liability, or lenders will cease
to lend to clients who face some degree of environmental risk."'
Furthermore, when the lack of predictable liability standards renders creditors

140. See Steven B. Bass, Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
ReauthorizationAct on the Commercial Lending Industry: A CriticalAssessment, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 879, 892 (1987).
141. See Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Dealfor Lenders? 22
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1158 (1991) (The bankers now ask us to let them forget about the potential
environmental problems they have helped bankroll, at least until they can pass them off to another
owner or until the tax-funded superlbnd picks up the tab.)
142. See 5 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 1, 25 (1990).
143. Id. See also YALE Note, supra note 2, at 929.
144. YALE Note, supra note 2, at 930.
145. (This is the same logic as applies to the "innocent purchaser" defense contained in section
9601(35)(A)). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A). See also supra notes 30 and 80-96 and
accompanying text.
146. YALE note, supra note 2, at 930.
147. See generally JAMES P. O'BRIEN, ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE: THE COMPLETE
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE LENDERS, BUYERS, SELLERS, AND ATTORNEYS (BNA 1989).
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unsure as to whether their advice to management encouraging environmental
diligence will be perceived as management participation, that lender will prefer
to remain ignorant as to the nature of a debtor's activities."
In sum, the
actual or perceived hazard of incurring CERCLA liability effectively precludes
lenders from acting independently to realize CERCLA's long term goals by
reducing the capacity of lenders to prudently monitor their investments and by
decreasing their incentive to encourage environmental diligence.'
V. THE SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION: A REFINED DEFINITION

The chilling effect on the commercial lending industry can be minimized
by the development of workable guidelines governing the allowable level of
lender management participation. This can easily be accomplished in the context
of CERCLA's present liability scheme. The amendment proposed in this Note
sets forth a clear guideline for lenders and the courts concerning the CERCLA
secured creditor exemption.
Clear guidelines can easily be established by refining the present definition
of the secured creditor exemption contained in section 9601(20)(A), which
defines "owner or operator".
The last sentence of section 9601(20)(A)
containing the exclusionary language of the existing secured creditor exemption
currently reads as follows:
Such term [referring to "owner or operator"] does not include a
person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility."
The proposed amendment to section 9601(20)(A) contains two prongs. The
first prong of the amendment contains language designed to clarify the secured
creditor exemption by clarifying the allowable level of lender participation. The
second prong consists of adding an affirmative duty designed to foster
environmentally diligent lending practices by lending institutions. Both prongs
can be accomplished by adding the following language to section 9601(20)(A):
Any person who holds an indicia of ownership in a vessel or facility
primarily to protect a security interest therein, will be deemed not to
have participated in the management of a vessel or facility if the extent

148. In the face of financial difficulties, environmental compliance usually takes a back seat to
more pressing short term economic considerations. See Frost, supra note 42, at 957.
149. Id. (In the course of an attempt to help the borrower out of financial difficulty nothing
under CERCLA assures that loan proceeds are directed towards environmental compliance.)
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
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of that person's involvement, exclusive of the initial negotiation of the
security interest, consists of no more than the appointment of a
management team, not to be comprised of that person's employees or
agents. Furthermore, such a person must complete an environmental
audit prior to the execution of the security agreement.
Under the expanded and clarified definition of lender participation, secured
creditors are no longer forced to stand idly by as financially troubled and
environmentally questionable borrowers slide into insolvency. Instead, a secured
creditor may act to protect its investment through the appointment of a
management team."' Through the operation of the management team as
defined above, the lender is separated from the actual management of the
borrower's operations by a "chinese wall."' This effectively precludes actual
or potential management participation by the lender, while still allowing the
management team, analogous to a bankruptcy trustee, to safeguard the lender's
financial interests by offering financial guidance.'
The goals of CERCLA are further served by requiring lenders to inquire
into the nature of the borrower's business activities and the past and present uses
of the property used as collateral. The "environmental audit" requirement thus
works to ensure that lenders take an affirmative role to reveal past problems and
to prevent the financing of future environmental nightmares." Even though

151. The powers of the management team could be analogous to the powers of a trustee in
bankruptcy, although not quite as extensive. The exact parameters of such an "environmental
trustee" would have to be worked out by Congress.
152. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 (a)(1), reprintedin MURRAY
L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2d ed. 1985).
153. The powers of the management team, although analogous to the powers of a trustee in
bankruptcy, would not be quite so extensive. The Federal Bankruptcy laws empower a trustee in
bankruptcy to buy, sell or lease property and/or equipment, and also give the trustee the power to
determine whether to continue a bankrupt's business operations pending the outcome of a liquidation
or reorganization. See II U.S.C. §§ 363, 1104-08 (West 1990).
The powers of the management team in the revised CERCLA context should, like the
parameters of the security agreement itself, be negotiated ahead of time.
154. The precise parameters of the environmental due diligence standard is beyond the scope
of this Note. However, there is presently underway an effort by the American Society of Testing
and Materials (ASTM) to establish these standards. The ASTM presently has a subcommittee on
Environmental Assessments in Commercial Real Estate Transactions. See Bruce P. Howard &
Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCL4: Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1187, 1226 (1991). Presumably, the standards will encompass a wide variety of inquiries
based on the experiential backlog of commercial real estate representatives, members of the lending
industry, environmentalists and public interest groups, and engineers. Id.
The standards for environmental audits should also be applied to establish the minimum
inquiry required in order to entitle a party to the protection of the innocent purchaser defense
contained in § 9601(35)(A). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
The ASTIM is a private organization that establishes voluntary standards for an unbelievably

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss3/10

Read: The Comprehensive and Liability Act After United States v. Fleet

1992]

LENDER LIABILITY GUIDELINES

893

this affirmative role will entail increased transaction costs, given the amount of
potential CERCLA liability at stake, this quid pro quo should be seen as
reasonable by lenders and should clearly represent the desirable and prudent
course of action.
VI. CONCLUSION

Despite CERCLA's secured creditor exemption, banks, financial
institutions, and other secured creditors have been subjected to gradually
increasing CERCLA liability. Unfortunately, the courts' expansion of lender
liability under CERCLA has not been accompanied by a clear articulation of
predictable standards by which lenders can guide their future actions. The
resulting fear of litigation, whether real or perceived, has created a chilling
effect on the commercial lending industry. This chilling effect can be minimized
by the development of workable guidelines governing the allowable level of
lender activity under CERCLA's present liability scheme. However, Congress
must adopt an approach that does not allow indifferent and unenlightened lenders
to completely avoid CERCLA liability. The proposed amendment contained in
this Note provides workable guidelines for lenders that allow them to monitor
their investments, if and only if those lenders are willing to act affirmatively to
foster private efforts to achieve CERCLA's long term goals.
DAVID C. READ

diverse array of engineering testing procedures, as well as standards for business and industry.
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